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AGGREGATION AND URBAN 
MISDEMEANORS 
Alexandra Natapoff* 
ABSTRACT 
The urban misdemeanor process relies on a wide variety of 
informal groupings and aggregations.  Order maintenance police 
arrest large numbers of people based on neighborhood, age, race, and 
other generalizations.  Prosecutors and public defenders resolve 
entire classes of minor plea bargains based on standard local practices 
and pricing.  Urban courts process hundreds of cases en masse.  At 
each stage, the pressure to aggregate—to treat people and cases by 
group—weakens and sometimes eliminates individuated scrutiny of 
defendants and the evidence in their cases; people are largely 
evaluated, convicted, and punished by category and based on 
institutional habit.  This wholesale process of creating criminal 
convictions in the aggregate is in deep tension with core precepts of 
criminal law, most fundamentally the idea that criminal guilt is an 
individuated concept reflecting the defendant’s personal culpability. 
This Article traces the influence of different sorts of aggregation 
through each step of the urban misdemeanor process, demonstrating 
how that process has effectively abandoned the individuated model of 
guilt and lost many of the essential characteristics of a classic 
“criminal” system of legal judgment.  It then explores civil 
scholarship’s insights into the substantive power that informal 
aggregations can exert over liability rules and outcomes, in particular 
how mass settlement scenarios can generate no-fault liability regimes 
with high risks of fraud.  The Article concludes that the misdemeanor 
system as it currently stands does not function as a traditional 
“criminal” system of judgment in large part because aggregation 
erodes the substantive content of criminal convictions. 
 
* Professor of Law & Theodore A. Bruinsma Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los 
Angeles.  This Article was developed in part while I was a Scholar-in-Residence at 
NYU School of Law, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law.  My thanks to 
participants at the Fordham Law School Cooper-Walsh Colloquium and the 
University of Chicago Criminal Justice Roundtable, and to my colleagues at the 
Loyola faculty workshop series. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of criminal guilt is fundamentally individuated.  The 
idea that someone is “guilty”—that he or she “committed a crime”—
refers inexorably to that particular individual and his or her actions 
and intentions.  Not all criminal legal concepts are individuated in this 
way.  Sentencing categories, CompStat policing, even inferences 
about probable cause or reasonable suspicion often rest quite 
properly on categorical reasoning and generalizations about human 
behavior.  But the ultimate determination of personal guilt is special.  
It constitutes a unique sort of statement about individual action and 
culpability, the polar opposite of “guilt by association.”  Likewise, the 
consequences of a conviction—punishment, stigma, and other 
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burdens—are justified largely by reference to the notion that a 
particular criminal offender personally deserves those burdens.  In 
the simplest terms, we are permitted to punish “criminals”—people 
who have sustained convictions—because getting convicted indicates 
that a particular person did something that can and should be 
punished. 
Because of the individualized nature of the underlying concept of 
criminal liability, the basic rules and procedures by which liability is 
imposed are themselves strongly individuated.  They are designed, at 
least in theory, to ensure that convictions properly attach to the 
individuals who actually committed particular crimes.  In effect, the 
demand for individualized evidence and individuated proceedings 
reflects a deeper understanding that the ultimate decision to impose 
legal guilt is particular to that defendant and therefore requires an 
individuated path. 
In the massive world of petty offense processing, that fundamental 
commitment to individuation has eroded.  The urban misdemeanor 
system in particular is permeated by various forms of aggregation and 
group-based processing.  More than any other area of the criminal 
system, misdemeanor defendants are identified, processed, convicted, 
and punished in large numbers based on generalized characteristics 
through procedures that are insensitive to individual evidence or 
circumstances.  Some of these “aggregations” take place during 
policing; others take place during the mass adjudication process.  At 
each stage, the sheer scale and institutional habits of the urban petty 
offense system put immense pressure on decision-makers to forgo 
individualized considerations.  The resulting decisions are thus 
unmoored from individuated evidence and made without the 
particularized scrutiny promised by bedrock due process norms. 
The aggregations of the urban misdemeanor system are informal, 
often institutionally based, and take different forms.  For example, 
order maintenance policing often involves the arrest of groups of 
people driven by aggregate generalizations about age, neighborhood, 
and race.  Later in the process, overworked public defenders typically 
advise clients to accept pleas based on aggregate criteria such as the 
“market price” for that offense in that jurisdiction, rather than the 
individual evidence or characteristics of that particular defendant.  
Bail is often set based on a schedule; punishments are standardized to 
the offense rather than the offender.  While the aggregating or non-
individualistic tendencies at each stage may appear tolerable for that 
particular decision-maker, or tempered by the possibility of later 
individuated consideration, taken together the aggregate tendencies 
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swamp the whole.  As a result, the misdemeanor process is dominated 
by group inferences and aggregate institutional habits, and only 
weakly tied to the sorts of individuated demands for evidence and 
process that assure the validity of criminal convictions. 
As a result of these various aggregating tendencies, the urban 
misdemeanor process is in tension with many core legitimating 
features of the criminal process itself.  Most fundamentally, 
misdemeanor processing is lackadaisical about individual guilt, i.e., 
the idea that criminal liability with its personal stigma and social 
consequences can only attach to individuals, not to groups, and that 
liability should be based on actus reus and mens rea, i.e., what 
individuals do and intend.  Instead, the process tends to select and 
convict people en masse without the standard procedural checks that 
ask whether individual defendants actually did what they are accused 
of doing.  Accordingly, these aggregating tendencies are not merely 
procedural flaws but conceptual game-changers: taken together they 
call into question whether the urban petty offense system actually 
selects and adjudicates guilt based on individual criminal culpability.  
While there is no precise moment when the process declares guilt 
based on group membership, the collective effects of aggregation 
drive the process in that direction.  At its worst, these aggregating 
tendencies indicate that, in an important sense, the urban 
misdemeanor system does not behave in the individuated ways that a 
“criminal system,” with all its moral and punitive power, is supposed 
to behave in order to wield the unique authority of criminal justice. 
The criminal discourse does not openly acknowledge the formative 
influence of aggregation on misdemeanors.  This is in part because 
the petty offense process is rarely conceptualized as a unified whole.  
Instead, each stage—especially urban policing—tends to get 
scrutinized on its own terms with limited reference to what happens 
at other stages in the process.  For example, there is a robust 
literature on the racially skewed, indiscriminate sweeping quality of 
urban policing processes such as order maintenance and zero 
tolerance.  A different scholarship criticizes the mass processing of 
urban petty offenders by overburdened and under-resourced public 
defender offices.  The full picture, however, is even more troubling 
than the individual critiques.  Because each stage tolerates decisions 
made in the aggregate based on generalizations, earlier aggregations 
slip through and are reinforced by later ones.  Not only does 
adjudication neglect to check the overly generalized decisions made 
during investigation, it permits new aggregations to leave their mark. 
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Perhaps more fundamentally, the criminal discourse fails to 
acknowledge the force of its own aggregating tendencies because they 
are forbidden.  At rock bottom, it is illegitimate to impose criminal 
convictions in the aggregate, and so traditional doctrines and 
frameworks do not accommodate such descriptions.  Not so in the 
civil literature.  Because civil law makes room for formal aggregations 
such as class actions and multidistrict litigation, the scholarship has 
better analytic tools to recognize the impact of informal aggregations 
that occur without legal or judicial imprimatur.1 
In particular, the civil literature offers two insights into the 
substantive effects of informal aggregation that have surprising 
resonance in the misdemeanor context.  The first is the recognition 
that an individual aggregator—such as a large well-resourced plaintiff 
or prosecutor’s office—can shape the litigation process to impose 
enormous pressure to settle on small dispersed parties who lack 
resources and incentives to contest small claims.  In effect, the power 
to informally aggregate others is a form of socio-legal authority.  
Second, the mass settlement environment can create an informal “no-
fault” regime in which liability is presumed once an allegation of 
injury (or in the criminal arena, guilt) has been made.  Where 
centralized bureaucracies are formally adversarial (large plaintiff law 
firms versus insurance companies, prosecutorial versus public 
defender offices) but in fact have strong institutional understandings 
that cases will settle as a matter of generic routine, it erodes 
substantive liability requirements.  In other words, informal 
institutional aggregations can actually change the operative content of 
the law.2 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the effects of aggregation 
in the criminal law, and the misdemeanor process in particular, with 
respect to the foundational question of personal guilt.  It identifies 
urban misdemeanors as the most extreme expression of the system’s 
tendency to answer the question of criminal guilt in the aggregate 
and, in turn, identifies aggregation as a key feature of what is 
problematic about urban policing and the generation of petty 
convictions.  It is the second article in a series exploring the 
significance of the misdemeanor process for the U.S. criminal system 
a whole.3 
 
 1. See infra Part IV. 
 2. See infra Part IV. 
 3. The first article describes the misdemeanor process and its deviations from 
core principles of criminal justice including due process, evidence-based accuracy, 
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Part I articulates the structural, legitimating role of individuation in 
criminal convictions.  It describes how philosophical commitments to 
individuation are intimately tied both to notions of rule-of-law and to 
the democratic state’s moral authority to punish.  It then identifies 
concrete rules and mechanisms by which the criminal system enforces 
this individuation commitment and traces the specifics of how they 
ensure individuated outcomes.  It is precisely such rules and 
mechanisms that erode or go unenforced in the misdemeanor context, 
effectively permitting aggregate decision making without formal 
acknowledgement or validation. 
Part II conceptualizes “informal aggregation” as a set of decisional 
tendencies that quietly erode individualizing procedures and 
commitments central to the criminal process.  While aggregation 
takes different forms at various stages of the criminal process, some 
versions are conceptually more pernicious than others.  Moreover, 
while informal aggregations exist throughout the system, they do not 
affect outcomes in the same way.  At the top of the penal hierarchy, 
where cases are serious and/or well-litigated, defendants can insist on 
countervailing individualizing procedures and escape the influence of 
aggregate tendencies.  At the bottom, by contrast, the mass 
adjudication of hundreds of thousands of petty offenses and poor 
defendants precludes such rigor.4  Here, aggregation tendencies 
collectively overwhelm the individualized ideal. 
Part III zeroes in on the specific aggregating tendencies of each 
stage of the petty criminal process—from policing to bail to 
prosecutorial screening, defense counsel, plea bargaining, and the 
lower courts.  This examination reveals the concrete mechanisms by 
which each step of the misdemeanor system contributes to the erosion 
of individualized treatment and ultimately permits convictions to be 
produced in the aggregate. 
Part IV turns to the civil area in which the effects of informal 
aggregation are more widely acknowledged.  It focuses on two 
 
and racial neutrality. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1313 (2012) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors].  A third article describes the 
limited power of misdemeanor defense counsel to ensure fair outcomes in light of the 
structural imbalances of the misdemeanor process. See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon 
Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049 (2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Gideon 
Skepticism]. 
 4. For a conceptualization of the criminal system as a pyramid in which legality 
wanes towards the bottom, see Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid: Linking 
Criminal Theory and Social Practice (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file 
with author). 
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examples—high volume law suits against file sharers and other small, 
widely dispersed defendants, and so-called tort “settlement mills”—
that reveal the substantive impact that informal aggregation can have 
on case outcomes and the meaning of liability schemes. 
Part V contends that pervasive informal aggregation undermines 
the claim that the urban misdemeanor process is entitled to the moral 
and penal authority wielded by authentically “criminal” processes.  
This Part offers several ways of conceptualizing urban 
misdemeanors—as expressions of Herbert Packer’s “crime control” 
model, for example, or as a live example of “actuarial” justice.5  It 
concludes that aggregation is a prime contributor to the urban 
criminal system’s loss of legitimacy, both theoretically and in the eyes 
of its own subjects. 
To be clear, aggregation is not the sole flaw of the urban 
misdemeanor process.  It may not even be the worst.  Even if every 
misdemeanant were to receive fully individuated consideration, the 
petty offense system would still criminalize conduct that arguably 
should not be criminal in the first place.  It would still shift vast 
discretionary authority to the police, and it would likely still impose 
its heaviest burdens on socially vulnerable populations.  Moreover, 
aggregation is not unique to misdemeanors, since every arena of 
criminal justice must grapple in its own way with the tension between 
the ideals of individuation and the reality of bureaucratic 
generalizations.  Nevertheless, the concept of aggregation captures a 
large swath of what ails the urban misdemeanor process.  It elucidates 
the system’s indifference to evidentiary accuracy, its class and racial 
skew, and the dehumanization of assembly line processing.  
Aggregation thus provides a powerful conceptual lens through which 
to understand and critique one of the largest and most dysfunctional 
segments of the American criminal process. 
I.  THE ANTI-AGGREGATION PRINCIPLE IN CRIMINAL LAW 
Aggregation is anathema to the traditional concept of criminal 
guilt.  At its core, criminal law is about evidence of personal 
culpability—whether a particular individual committed a particular 
crime and therefore can be legitimately punished—an inquiry that by 
its nature must take place person by person.  As Justice Frankfurter 
once put it, “[t]he administration of law, particularly that of the 
criminal law, normally operates in an environment that is not 
 
 5. See infra Part V. 
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universal or even general but individual.”6  Criminal jurisprudence 
revolves largely around individuated notions of personal culpability, 
free will, and liberty.  Central tenets of criminal law are devoted to 
ensuring both substantive and procedural individuation: defendants 
are entitled both to a substantive evidentiary basis for finding guilt 
under law, and procedures that ensure that they are evaluated and 
adjudicated on the merits of their specific cases.7  To a more limited 
extent, they are also entitled to be treated as individual people, with 
unique histories and desires that inform their personal choices about 
how to handle their own criminal cases.  This is not to say that 
criminal law claims to be free of heuristics and group-based 
generalizations: it is riddled with them as are all human cognitive 
endeavors.8  But in the main, criminal law and theory strain mightily 
to reduce the impact of such reasoning and to keep questions of guilt 
firmly rooted in individuated scenarios of evidence and procedure. 
A. Theoretical Commitments to Individuation 
Classic criminal theory revolves around three interrelated 
concerns: moral culpability, free will, and the punitive authority of the 
state.9  Each of these concepts is keyed to various aspects of 
individualism.  To the extent that a person commits a crime worthy of 
moral condemnation, and does so as a product of his free will (for 
example, by intentionally committing a voluntary act), the state is 
entitled to punish him.  Conversely, unless that person has done 
something to deserve and warrant punishment, the state lacks moral 
 
 6. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 366 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 7. See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 
2, 44 (2012) (“If there are several defendants accused of committing several crimes, 
none of them will be convicted even if statistically each of them probably committed 
some of the crimes.”).  Porat and Posner assume that what they call “cross-person 
aggregation”—in effect statistical guilt-by-association—does not occur in criminal 
law, although in some sense this is precisely the result of procedural aggregation in 
the misdemeanor context. 
 8. See generally DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S 
RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012) (documenting how 
prosecutors experience professional incentives and psychological pressures that 
contribute to wrongful convictions); DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (2012) (arguing that investigative and adjudicative 
processes are often inaccurate due to widespread cognitive flaws in police and legal 
decision making). 
 9. See, e.g., Gideon Yaffe, “The Government Beguiled Me”: The Entrapment 
Defense and the Problem of Private Entrapment, 1 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 2, 5 (2005) 
(discussing conceptual relationships between moral action, free choice, and 
government conduct). 
NATAPOFF_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:34 PM 
2013] AGGREGATION & MISDEMEANORS 1051 
and political authority to move against him, at least in a democratic 
state committed to liberal values of individual liberty and autonomy.10  
Indeed, the central proffered justifications for the penal process—
retributivism, deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation11—assume the 
existence of an individual agent who can be morally judged, 
psychologically deterred, behaviorally rehabilitated, or at the very 
least forcibly prevented from reoffending.12 
More formally, the concept of individuated decision—making and 
the application of rules to particular facts is a central feature of rule-
of-law.  Particularized decision—making is the opposite of “guilt by 
association,” condemnation based on status, and other 
generalizations forbidden by criminal law.  As Frederick Schauer put 
it, 
[T]o make decisions on the basis of the characteristics of particular 
events or particular individuals, rather than on the basis of the 
characteristics of the groups or classes of which the particulars may 
be members, is often thought to be a moral imperative.  Indeed, it is 
often thought to define the concept of justice . . . .13 
By contrast, collective punishment has few philosophical 
defenders.14  It finds its strongest support in connection with atypical 
 
 10. Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 307, 313–14 (2004) (“If the idea of a liberal democracy means 
anything, it means a commitment to what we can think of as the ‘baseline’ liberal 
democratic values: individual liberty, dignity, and bodily integrity; limited 
government; the primacy and sovereignty of the individual; and the entitlement of all 
citizens to equal consideration and respect.”). 
 11. Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2012). 
 12. By contrast, as an empirical matter, sociological analyses often describe the 
criminal process as dissociated from these classic normative justifications and more 
concerned with matters of group identification and control.  These descriptive 
assertions are discussed infra in Part V. 
 13. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 19–20 
(2003).  Schauer himself rejects this classic formulation, arguing that there is nothing 
morally sacrosanct about the individual or the particular.  In his view, all legal 
reasoning is in essence a form of actuarial reasoning, and under certain circumstances 
such reasoning can be sufficiently accurate and rigorous to legitimately support 
criminal liability. Id. at 18–19, 22–23. 
 14. Compare Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 349 
(2003) (providing a “functional defense” of collective sanctions and arguing that 
“collective sanctions might be justified as an indirect way of controlling individual 
wrongdoers”), with M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors: 
Understanding “Zero-Tolerance” Policing as a Form of Collective Punishment and 
Human Rights Violation, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 373, 373 (2011) (characterizing collective 
punishment as a violation of international human rights law). 
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scenarios and offenses such as blood feuds,15 conspiracy,16 and war 
crimes,17 although even conspiracy requires some individualized 
culpability.18  In the main, criminal jurisprudence is firmly rooted in 
what Chris Kutz calls the “solipsism of the individualistic conception” 
of personal accountability and criminal guilt.19 
B. Substantive Individuation in Criminal Law 
This theoretical commitment to individuation is instantiated in core 
substantive criminal rules and procedures.  Perhaps the most obvious 
is the mens rea requirement itself, the demand that in all but a 
handful of cases, criminal guilt requires inquiry into what the 
defendant subjectively, actually intended at the time of the offense.20  
The idea that a person’s criminal culpability turns on the exercise of 
their free will, their decisional capacities, and their knowledge of 
consequences, is the ultimate commitment to individuation.21 
Although we don’t always think about it this way, the requirement 
of evidence is also a commitment to individuation.  Evidence is how 
we know a particular person committed a particular crime.  It is 
evidence that permits the application of general rules to specific 
 
 15. Levinson, supra note 14, at 352–54. 
 16. For example, Christopher Kutz’s philosophy of complicity would expand the 
classic individualistic conception of accountability to include a “relational and 
positional conception” in which an individual’s culpability would be evaluated in part 
by reference to his relations to others. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND 
LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 10 (2000). 
 17. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: 
The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 570–71 (2005) (arguing that 
“[t]he group element to certain international crimes, especially genocide . . . is central 
to the offense,” and therefore “international criminal law’s formal predicate of 
avoiding collective guilt may need to be revisited”). 
 18. See United States v. Garcia, 151 F.3d 1243, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(defendant’s membership in violent gang and participation in group assault was 
insufficient to establish crime of conspiracy and would “smack of guilt by 
association”). 
 19. KUTZ, supra note 16, at 5. 
 20. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2011) (imposing a mens rea 
requirement on all but a small category of offenses). 
 21. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 27 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 
51 (2003).  The notion that people have free will separate and apart from their social 
contexts is, of course, a long-contested proposition. See Craig Haney, Making Law 
Modern: Toward a Contextual Model of Justice, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 17–
19 (2002) (arguing that traditional criminal concepts of free will and autonomy are 
outdated in light of modern psychological contextualism). 
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cases, the driving dynamic of rule of law itself.22  Without evidence, 
there is no reason to think any particular person is guilty of a crime 
and therefore no basis for attributing liability to them. 
Criminal law varies its demand for evidentiary individuation 
depending on the nature of the legal conclusion to be drawn.23  A 
Terry stop requires individuation, but only in the form of evidence 
amounting to reasonable suspicion;24 probable cause requires 
“particularized” evidence rendering it probable that a crime has been 
committed;25 by contrast, a conviction at trial requires certainty 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular person committed a 
particular crime.26  By adjusting the demand for individuated 
evidence, the law signals the extent to which the law will or will not 
tolerate the classic aggregative move of imposing “guilt by 
association.”27  It also signals the robustness of the legal conclusions 
about individual guilt that can be drawn at any given stage of the 
process, the most important being the conclusion that the person is 
eligible not merely for a stop or arrest but an actual conviction. 
C. Procedural Individuation 
Criminal procedure provides the concrete mechanisms by which we 
enforce our theoretical commitment to substantive individuation.  
Numerous criminal procedural rules are aimed at generating 
individuated answers to key questions: Did this defendant actually do 
it?  Did this defendant know what his rights were? Were this 
defendant’s personal choices honored?  Doctrinally speaking, the 
 
 22. Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of 
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1501, 1538 (2001) (describing the law of evidence as 
those rules designed to “increase the frequency with which truth [about guilt] is 
ascertained” and arguing that this “veritistic” question “is the question all evidence 
scholarship should be asking”); see also Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232, 1233 
(1971) (“It is beyond question, of course, that a conviction based on a record lacking 
any relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged would violate 
due process.”). 
 23. I have written more extensively about the relationship between guilt, 
evidence, and informational rules in Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of 
the Criminal System, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965 (2008). 
 24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). 
 25. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979). 
 26. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358 (1970). 
 27. Compare Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91 (known drug activity in bar was insufficiently 
individuated evidence to support probable cause with respect to bar patron), with 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (police could consider defendant’s 
presence in high crime neighborhood in finding reasonable suspicion). 
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individuation requirement takes a number of forms, perhaps the most 
dramatic being the individual’s right to represent himself.  As the 
Court famously put it in Faretta, 
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall 
be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right 
to make his defense.  It is the accused, not counsel, who must be 
‘informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,’ who must be 
‘confronted with the witnesses against him,’ and who must be 
accorded ‘compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’28 
For defendants who do not represent themselves, defense counsel 
is the primary agent of individuation, the mechanism by which each 
defendant gets a fair and accurate adjudication with respect to him.  
Indeed, in 1972 when the Supreme Court insisted on the right to 
counsel for misdemeanants, it was motivated to do so in part to 
counter the aggregating tendencies of mass misdemeanor processing, 
where “[s]uddenly it becomes clear that for most defendants in the 
criminal process, there is scant regard for them as individuals.  They 
are numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on 
their way.  The gap between the theory and the reality is enormous.”29 
The defendant’s right to counsel itself is personal and individuated 
in a number of ways.  Counsel’s duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and 
competence run to the individual defendant.30  The defendant owns 
them, even after his death,31 and the attorney’s employer cannot 
interfere with them.32  Even attorneys for future defendants lack 
standing to enforce the defendants’ rights until their clients actually 
retain them.33 
Of particular importance in the misdemeanor context is the 
personal, individuated nature of the trial waiver.  Because the 
 
 28. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). 
 29. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 35 (1972) (quoting Dean Edward 
Barrett). 
 30. United States v. Smith, 454 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2006) (attorney-client 
privilege is personal and belongs solely to the client and cannot be asserted by 
anyone else); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(attorney lacked standing to assert Sixth Amendment challenge to statute because 
the right to effective counsel is personal to criminal defendants). 
 31. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (attorney-client 
privilege survives death of client). 
 32. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1981) (public defender’s 
loyalties ran to client, not to the Public Defender’s Office, and therefore defender 
was not acting under color of law for the purposes of § 1983). 
 33. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004) (appellate attorneys lacked standing 
to challenge law denying defendants appellate counsel until they had actual clients). 
NATAPOFF_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:34 PM 
2013] AGGREGATION & MISDEMEANORS 1055 
misdemeanor system runs largely on pleas, as does the criminal 
system more generally,34 the extent to which waivers reflect individual 
knowledge, choice, and culpability is crucial to the overall legitimacy 
of the process.  Waivers must be “intentional,”35 meaning that the 
individual defendant must subjectively intend to plead.36  The 
Supreme Court has held that the decision to plead guilty is personal 
to the defendant; like the waiver of counsel, it requires his “express 
personal consent” and no one else can do it for him.37  At the outer 
limit, a defendant who denies culpability may still choose to plead, 
but even here the defendant personally makes the decision in light of 
his options and desires.38  This insistence that waiver is something 
only a defendant can personally choose keeps the plea system 
anchored in individuation: it embodies the idea that each and every 
defendant who pleads is still being treated as a unique individual on 
the merits of his or her case. 
D. Aggregation at Sentencing 
These core commitments to individuation have generated a robust 
debate in the area of sentencing, particularly with respect to the 
advent of sentencing guidelines.  On the one hand, at least in theory, 
the imposition of punishment is a highly individuated process.  As the 
Court recently put it, “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a 
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability 
of the criminal offender.”39  On the other hand, determinate 
sentencing is a form of aggregation: the categorical determination of 
 
 34. Between 90–95% of felony convictions are the result of a guilty plea. See 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN 
STATE COURT, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES (2009), available at http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF 
FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf (99.6% of misdemeanants plead 
guilty). 
 35. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
 36. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966) (invalidating plea because defendant’s 
statements indicated that he lacked intent to waive trial). 
 37. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 247–48 (2008) (contrasting trial 
waivers with consent to have a magistrate judge preside over voir dire, to which 
defense counsel can agree without the defendant’s personal consent). 
 38. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32, 37–38 (1970) (emphasizing Alford’s 
personal “view,” “desire” and “choice” to plead guilty). 
 39. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 
U.S. 137, 149 (1987)). 
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punishment based on offense category and criminal history insensitive 
to defendants’ individuated characteristics.40  Years ago, Albert 
Alschuler mourned this trend towards aggregation, arguing that “the 
movement from individualized to aggregated sentences . . . has 
marked a backward step in the search for just criminal 
punishments.”41  He maintained further that: 
Increased aggregation seems characteristic of current legal and 
social thought, and what I have called “the bottom-line collectivist-
empirical mentality” now seems to threaten traditional concepts of 
individual worth and entitlement.  Commentators speak 
misleadingly of “group rights.”  Judges determine the scope of legal 
rules, not by examining the circumstances of individual cases, but by 
speculating about the customary behavior of large groups.42  
Sentencing law also varies its demand for individuation depending 
on the seriousness of the offense.  Not surprisingly, individuation 
requirements are highest in death penalty doctrine.  “In capital cases, 
the Constitution demands that the punishment be tailored both to the 
nature of the crime itself and to the defendant’s ‘personal 
responsibility and moral guilt.’”43  To be fair, a capital sentencing 
scheme must treat each person convicted of a capital offense with that 
“degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual . . . .”44  In 
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the 
Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the 
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the 
process of inflicting the penalty of death.45  Indeed, when the Court 
invalidated the death penalty with respect to defendants who 
committed offenses when they were minors, Justice O’Connor 
dissented, arguing that a flat rule based on age was inconsistent with 
the precept that  “[t]he criminal justice system . . . provides for 
individualized consideration of each defendant.”46 
 
 40. SCHAUER, supra note 13, at 257 (“The Sentencing Guidelines stand as a 
repudiation of this particularistic understanding of the nature of law [and] represent a 
triumph of generalization over individuation.”). 
 41. Albert Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less 
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 902 (1991). 
 42. Id. at 904. 
 43. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 589 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)). 
 44. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 45. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
 46. Roper, 543 U.S. at 620 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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Categorical sentencing is constitutionally permissible in non-capital 
cases,47 and with respect to these cases the Court has held that lighter 
punishments require less individuation.  This linkage is embodied in 
the rule of Scott v. Illinois, in which the Court held that misdemeanor 
defendants who are not sentenced to prison are not entitled to 
counsel.48  Because counsel is the primary guarantor of accuracy and 
individuation,49 Scott effectively approved reduced individuation 
where there is minimal punishment. 
E. Permissible Procedural Aggregation 
In addition to sentencing, criminal law tolerates a variety of 
procedural forms of aggregation with respect to non-guilt issues.  
Brandon Garrett catalogues these to include the appointment of 
special masters to investigate repeated forensic fraud, aggregate 
examinations of death penalty convictions for racial disparities, 
aggregate claims of insufficient defense representation, and 
consolidated federal habeas corpus petitions.50  Garrett argues that 
such procedural case aggregations can improve accuracy and justice, 
and he advocates for a greater role for aggregate decision making.  
Importantly, Garrett makes clear that he is addressing procedural 
aggregation on “limited issues—criminal procedural rights distinct 
from individual questions of guilt . . . .”51  With the exception of group 
crimes, Garrett agrees that aggregation is never appropriate on the 
underlying question of criminal liability and that guilt determinations 
“must be highly individualized.”52 
Similarly, Adam Zimmerman and David Jaros argue for greater 
procedural aggregation at sentencing in large-scale fraud and 
environmental criminal cases with numerous victims.53  In such cases, 
prosecutors in effect preside over something akin to a “criminal class 
action,” in which a victim class seeks damages—in the form of 
 
 47. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (noting that individuation in non-capital cases 
reflects “simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative”). 
 48. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
 49. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 665 (2002) (deeming “conviction [to 
be] credited as reliable because the defendant had access to the ‘guiding hand of 
counsel’” (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972))). 
 50. Brandon Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383 (2007). 
 51. Id. at 387. 
 52. Id. at 394. 
 53. Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1385 (2011). 
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restitution—from a single defendant.54  Like Garrett, Zimmerman 
and Jaros skirt the question of aggregation on liability issues, 
maintaining only that the sentencing process in these types of cases 
should be more responsive to the needs of the victim class. 
In sum, there is limited conceptual room for aggregation in the 
criminal system.  It exists in various forms at sentencing, and in 
connection with procedures that address non-liability issues such as 
forensic accuracy or widespread rights violations.  On the core issue 
of criminal guilt, however, the universally accepted position is that 
aggregation is impermissible.  The remainder of this Article explores 
how, despite this bedrock view, the urban misdemeanor process 
effectively imposes convictions in the aggregate by permitting the 
erosion and evasion of individuating rules and procedures. 
II.  INFORMAL AGGREGATION 
The informal aggregations of the criminal system come in many 
flavors and go by many names, from “actuarial”55 policing to racial 
profiling, “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” lawyering, categorical 
sentencing, and the catch-all, “assembly line justice.”56  They tend to 
render substantive decisions based on categorical generalizations or 
institutional policies in ways that sideline individual defendant 
characteristics, the most important being the factual question of 
whether that particular defendant actually committed a particular 
crime.57  Some aggregations represent valid forms of decision making 
 
 54. Zimmerman and Jaros argue that victims in these classes are currently 
underserved by the lack of formal aggregation at the sentencing stage, and that they 
deserve similar sorts of representation and oversight protections that their civil 
counterparts receive in a formal class action setting. Id. at 398–99. 
 55. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, 
POLICING AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) (“[P]rediction instruments 
increasingly determine individual outcomes in our policing, law enforcement, and 
punishment practices.”); see also Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial 
Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 173 
(1994) (describing actuarial justice as “concerned with techniques for identifying, 
classifying and managing groups” and contrasting it with the “Old Penology [that] is 
rooted in a concern for individuals, and preoccupied with such concepts as guilt”). 
 56. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972). 
 57. As Harcourt points out, all decisionmaking is categorical in the broadest sense 
that all conclusions require an inferential step. HARCOURT, supra note 55, at 18 
(quoting Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1330 n.2 (1971)) (“[A]ll factual evidence is 
ultimately ‘statistical,’ and all legal proof ultimately ‘probabilistic,’ in the 
epistemological sense that no conclusion can ever be drawn from empirical data 
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in their own right; some are illegal.58  They are informal in the sense 
that the groupings are not created or validated by law or judicial 
order; unlike a civil class action, there is no legally binding effect on 
other class members.59  Rather, they are decisional tendencies that 
have come to characterize the petty criminal process in lasting and 
predictable ways.  They stem from a wide variety of sources, from 
public policies like order maintenance policing to the institutional 
pressures on public defense offices to resolve heavy caseloads.60  
Many of them are well-known features of the misdemeanor process.  
But because they are not formal rules that bind defendants as a class, 
they are rarely conceptualized as triggering the doctrinal and 
functional problems of class-based legal decision making.61 
In theory, the criminal process has numerous individuating 
procedures and opportunities that serve as antidotes to informal 
aggregation.  A prosecutor screens police arrest decisions before 
filing charges to ensure that the particular defendant warrants 
prosecution.62  Defense lawyers not only evaluate cases but also create 
individual relationships with defendants to ensure that they 
understand their own cases and that their decisions are honored.63  
Courts provide individual hearings—plea colloquies to establish 
knowing and voluntary pleas, or trials to establish factual guilt.  The 
defendant himself has opportunities to express his individuality: to 
confer with a lawyer unfettered by conflicts; to testify at trial; to 
confront the witnesses against him; to knowingly and intelligently 
 
without some step of inductive inference—even if only an inference that things are 
usually what they are perceived to be.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 58. See SCHAUER, supra note 13, at 176–79 (distinguishing permissible from 
impermissible racial profiling). 
 59. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (authorizing class actions with binding effects on 
class members). 
 60. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. 
LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S 
BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009); J.D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral 
Consequences, and the Adjudication of Misdemeanors, in THE PROSECUTOR IN 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 20–36 (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2011); 
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the 
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 282 (2011). 
 61. E.g., Garrett, supra note 50, at 396 (distinguishing institutional practices from 
formal aggregation and calling them “institutional systemization”). 
 62. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 29, 31–32 (2002). 
 63. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1469–75 (2005) (describing counsel’s various functions). 
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consent to a plea; to allocute at sentencing; and to self-represent.64  To 
be sure, aggregating features may influence each of these stages: 
generic prosecutorial policies, defense lack of resources, pressures on 
defendants to plead.  But the mere existence of some aggregation or 
generalization is not lethal.  The ideal is procedurally constructed to 
counter those tendencies and to provide a variety of individuating 
guarantees that the case is being decided on the evidence and in ways 
that the particular defendant understands and chooses. 
The misdemeanor system, however, has largely abandoned the 
individuated ideal.  The scale of misdemeanor dockets in conjunction 
with their speed and lack of adversarial resources make aggregation 
the norm.  While even serious cases and well-resourced defendants 
are affected by aggregation,65 those cases typically receive higher 
levels of scrutiny and greater adherence to individuating procedures.  
Such cases can thus be decided more closely to the merits and 
according to law, indulging in what Lawrence Friedman once referred 
to as the “luxury of slow, individuated justice.”66  By contrast, 
misdemeanors comprise the massive bottom of a penal pyramid 
where cases are processed quickly, in bulk, and where aggregation 
tendencies dominate.67 
William Stuntz made a similar point about the variable and 
hierarchical effect of law itself: “For crimes at the top of the severity 
scale, law defines both criminal liability and punishment;” for less 
serious offenses at the bottom, prosecutorial overcharging and 
bargaining are the real drivers.68  In the same way, for the most 
serious cases and the best-resourced defendants, we see the 
individuation ideal at its strongest: cases are scrutinized on the merits 
one by one, criminal procedures are honored, and what defendants 
know and choose can actually affect case outcomes.69  Duke lacrosse 
 
 64. See supra Part I. 
 65. Perhaps most famously by the impact of racial reasoning. See McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987) (acknowledging Baldus study documenting the 
influence of race in capital case outcomes). 
 66. Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 
STAN. L. REV. 786, 792 (1967) (distinguishing between clear cut rules of general 
application and discretionary rules that require specific factfinding). 
 67. Natapoff, supra note 4. 
 68. William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2564 (2004). 
 69. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM AND THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE (Touchstone 1997) (describing the anatomy of 
this well-litigated murder case).  Of course, even the most serious cases can be 
affected by categorical approaches. See MEDWED, supra note 8, at 22–25 (describing 
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player Reade Seligmann, whose high-powered defense team 
exonerated him from rape allegations, acknowledged his privileged 
spot at the top of that pyramid: “This entire experience has opened 
my eyes up to a tragic world of injustice I never knew existed . . . .  If 
police officers and a district attorney can systematically railroad us 
with absolutely no evidence whatsoever, I can’t imagine what they’d 
do to people who do not have the resources to defend themselves.”70 
Because generalized policies and aggregations dominate the 
misdemeanor system at each stage, commitments to individuation are 
repetitively weakened as defendants move through the process.  The 
aggregate processing habits of prosecutors and public defenders 
reinforce group-based decision making peculiar to policing.  Mass 
court processes validate and reinforce cookie-cutter plea bargaining.71  
By the end, when defendants are legally convicted, there may have 
been little or no individuated basis for that pronouncement of guilt.  
The next Part surveys the mechanics of that process, briefly 
examining each stage of the misdemeanor system to identify its 
aggregative characteristics and their potential effects on resulting 
convictions. 
III.  INFORMAL AGGREGATION IN THE URBAN MISDEMEANOR 
PROCESS 
A. Policing 
The police decision to stop and/or arrest a person is the threshold 
selection function of the criminal process.  It is increasingly clear that 
urban police often make such decisions based not on evidence of 
individual criminal behavior, but rather on group characteristics and 
location.  The aggregations are iterative: the aggregate qualities of 
stop and frisk policies have ripple effects on the arrest process, and 
the arrest process itself is heavily shaped by generalized decision 
making. 
 
prosecutorial overreliance on police and institutional tunnel vision that leads to 
wrongful convictions). 
 70. Duff Wilson & David Barstow, All Charges Dropped in Duke Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/us/12duke.html. 
 71. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1331–47 (describing 
misdemeanor process). 
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1. Aggregation in Stops 
The so-called “stop and frisk” phenomenon has become infamous 
for its aggregate qualities, particularly with respect to race.  In New 
York, the number of stops of young black men citywide in 2011 
actually exceeded the total number of young black men in the city 
(168,126 as compared to 158,406).72  In Brownsville—a high-crime, 
largely African American neighborhood in Brooklyn—the 
phenomenon is even more intense.  In an area that is approximately 
eight blocks wide with 14,000 residents, police made 52,000 stops in 
Brownsville between 2006 and 2010, which amounted to nearly one 
stop per year for each resident.73  Accordingly, living in Brownsville, 
or being a young black male in New York, has become a salient 
grouping mechanism triggering the likelihood of police action. 
Such practices that sweep entire groups of people into the criminal 
process are widely understood as class-wide policies that are not 
centrally driven by individuated considerations.74  Bernard Harcourt 
and Tracey Meares explain that this is in some ways inevitable 
because suspicion itself is a “probabilistic concept” that is almost 
always generated by “group-based-type behavior”:75 
For the most part, suspicion attaches to group-based traits, 
conditions, and behaviors; the police identify sets of individuals with 
motives, individuals who match a drug-courier profile, individuals 
 
 72. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2011, at 7 (2012), available at 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/NYCLU_2011_Stop-and-Frisk_Report.pdf.  
While black and Latino males between the ages of 14 and 24 account for 
only 4.7 percent of the city’s population, they accounted for 41.6 percent of 
those stopped [in 2011].  By contrast, white males between the ages 14 and 
24 make up 2 percent of the city’s population but accounted for 3.8 percent 
of stops. 
Id. 
 73. Ray Rivera, Al Baker & Janet Roberts, A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police 
Stops, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/ 
nyregion/12frisk.html (documenting police stop rate of 93 stops per 100 residents, as 
compared to a 7:100 stop rate in the rest of the city). 
 74. See Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief and Individual Damages ¶¶ 2–3, Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 
417 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2008) (No. 08 Civ. 01034) (civil rights class action alleging that 
the NYPD practice of stopping and frisking predominantly African American and 
Latino young men is illegal for lack of reasonable suspicion and because it is 
motivated by race). 
 75. Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth 
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 811 (2011). 
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who fit an eye-witness description, individuals who are in a specific 
location, or individuals who have the same blood type.76 
This fact—that all inferences involve aggregate generalizations—
has manifested in order maintenance policing in a particularly 
destructive way.  As Harcourt and Meares put it, the “aggregation of 
[demography and geography] helps to ‘race’ crime in a particular 
way,”77 such that young black men in cities all over the country 
automatically trigger “suspicion.”78 
Of course, police are not permitted by law to stop entire classes of 
people without evidence,79 and these stops are typically justified by 
individuated-sounding criteria.  The actual reasons that New York 
police assert for stopping individuals, however, are themselves heavily 
dominated by generalized categories including time of day, high-
crime location, and “furtive movements.”80  Such criteria are not 
themselves unique characteristics of criminal actors.  Instead, they are 
widely applicable, facially innocent criteria that could apply to almost 
anyone in those neighborhoods.81  Accordingly, even when police 
articulate such reasons above and beyond mere racial and 
neighborhood profiling, they are still effectively pursuing a class-wide 
policy because those reasons are not themselves individuated.  In this 
way, the generalized nature of the selection criteria permits an 
aggregate policy to masquerade as an individualized one. 
2. Aggregation in Arrests 
Arrests require more evidence than stops, and it is often assumed 
that while stops may be made in the aggregate, the decision to arrest 
is individuated to the suspect based on evidence of crime.  The idea is 
that while police might stop and frisk based on race and 
neighborhood, they wouldn’t actually arrest someone if he hadn’t 
 
 76. Id. at 813. 
 77. Id. at 854. 
 78. Id. at 858–59. 
 79. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000). 
 80. Most Frequently Listed Reasons for Stops: Citywide, Jan. 1, 2006–Dec. 31, 
2006, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/files/2006_Top_Five_ 
Reasons.pdf (last visited May 13, 2013). 
 81. Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race and the 
New Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 
595 (2010), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1740-1461. 
2010.01190.x/pdf (noting that in New York “only about 20 percent of all stops are 
based on specific subject descriptions”). 
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done something wrong.82  In this way, the demographic and 
geographic aggregations of the stop-and-frisk phenomenon are 
thought to be cured by the heightened evidentiary standards of the 
arrest process. 
Three pending civil rights lawsuits in New York illustrate the 
fallacy of that assumption.  In Stinson v. City of New York, plaintiffs 
allege a departmental practice of issuing summons without probable 
cause, driven by an NYPD quota requirement.83  In Gomez-Garcia v. 
New York City Police Department, plaintiffs challenge the NYPD 
practice of making a full custodial arrest for marijuana possession 
when New York law requires that individuals possessing less than 
twenty-five grams of marijuana be issued a Desk Appearance Ticket, 
akin to a traffic ticket.84  In Davis v. City of New York, plaintiffs 
challenge the legality of the NYPD policy of stopping and arresting 
public housing residents for trespassing.85 
Each of these lawsuits describes a policy that calls into question the 
individuated evidentiary validity of arrests.  Or to put it another way, 
they challenge the assumption that arrests are actually based on 
probable cause that the individual arrestee committed a crime, 
suggesting that arrests are in fact driven by many of the same 
aggregating tendencies as the stop and frisk process.  Stinson is the 
most direct, alleging that police simply issue summons without 
probable cause in order to meet a departmental arrest quota.86  Their 
proof lies in the high rate of summons dismissals for lack of probable 
cause.87  To the extent that the subsequent dismissal process does not 
 
 82. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (distinguishing Terry stops from 
arrests, noting that “[a]n arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual 
freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to 
serve are likewise quite different[;] [a]n arrest is the initial stage of a criminal 
prosecution”). 
 83. Stinson v. City of New York, 282 F.R.D. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class 
certification). 
 84. Verified Complaint, Gomez-Garcia v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 0451000-2012 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 22, 2012), available at http://www.legal-aid.org/ 
media/157211/06222012_marijuana_complaint.pdf. 
 85. Amended Complaint, Davis v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 0699 (SAS) 
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011); see also Complaint, Ligon v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 
2274 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2012) (challenging NY police program “Operation Clean 
Halls” in which police stop, search, and arrest residents of public housing projects 
typically for the offense of trespassing). 
 86. Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 363. 
 87. Id. at 366–65. 
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catch the errors, cases are being generated based on arrests that lack 
probable cause. 
In Gomez-Garcia, the allegation is that police are arresting people 
for possessing marijuana in public view when in fact police are 
arresting people who may have marijuana on their person (not a 
criminal offense) but only bring it into public view when the police 
order them to do so.88  These arrests are therefore based on “crimes” 
generated by police officers themselves.  More generally, Amanda 
Geller and Jeff Fagan have explained that despite the 
decriminalization of minor marijuana possession, the NYPD has 
“doubled down” on marijuana arrests as part of its order maintenance 
policing, and that marijuana arrest patterns exhibit many of the same 
racial and geographic biases that stop patterns do.89 
Finally, the Davis plaintiffs challenge the NYPD policy of arresting 
residents of public housing projects for trespassing when those 
individuals are often legally on the premises and therefore innocent.90  
The accuracy of plaintiffs’ claim was recently validated when the 
Bronx District Attorney’s office announced its intention to stop 
prosecuting such cases without requiring additional evidence from the 
police.91  In effect, the DA agreed that those arrests lacked probable 
cause. 
New York aside, there are many reasons to question more 
generally whether urban misdemeanor arrests are reliable indicators 
of individuated probable cause and thus whether they counter the 
aggregative tendencies of stop and frisk.  Urban police arrest 
individuals for all sorts of policy reasons unrelated to probable cause: 
to clear a street corner, to establish authority, or to send a message in 
 
 88. Verified Complaint ¶2, Gomez-Garcia v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 0451000-
2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 22, 2012). 
 89. Geller & Fagan, supra note 81, at 593-95.  Stop and arrest patterns were not 
identical, however. See id. at 605–07 (many precincts that recorded high marijuana 
arrests recorded fewer marijuana stops). 
 90. Amended Complaint, Davis v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 0699 (SAS) 
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011); see also Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Adam Carlis, Race 
and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-314, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133384 (describing “wholesale” trespassing enforcement 
policies in public housing and noting that N.Y. law “places almost no barriers 
between the police officer and a trespass arrest”). 
 91. Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/nyregion/in-the-bronx-
resistance-to-prosecuting-stop-and-frisk-arrests.html. 
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a high-crime neighborhood.92  As sociologist and former police officer 
Peter Moskos describes it, “[o]n street corners in Baltimore’s Eastern 
District, people—usually young black males involved with drugs—are 
arrested when they talk back to police or refuse to obey a police 
officer’s orders to move. . . .  These lockups are used by police to 
assert authority or get criminals off the street.”93  Similarly, Wesley 
Skogan and Tracey Meares described how police may make unlawful 
arrests in pursuit of other policy goals: 
[O]fficers sometimes bend rules because they simply want an 
individual that they have identified as a lawbreaker to get his or her 
“due” in a sort of retributive justice sense.  Officers can be quite 
strategic in pursuing these goals, including risking a bit of censure 
when they have other forms of evidence to fall back on if their 
actions are challenged.  Several studies found that officers intent on 
seizing contraband, disrupting illicit networks, or asserting their 
authority on the street freely violated the rules because their goal 
was not principally to secure an individual conviction.94 
In sum, urban police decisions to stop individuals are heavily 
conditioned by aggregate factors such as race, neighborhood, and 
order maintenance policies.  When those stops turn into arrests, there 
are weak guarantees that those arrests are based on the discovery of 
evidence: arrest decisions are similarly shaped by aggregate policies 
designed to maintain order and police authority that are not specific 
to the individuals being arrested.  These aggregating tendencies of the 
initial selection decisions of the petty criminal system set the stage for 
the rest of the process. 
B. Bail 
Once arrested, suspects may be released, required to pay bail, or 
detained.  The concept of bail is that a defendant who poses a flight 
risk and/or a risk to the community may be forced to post a monetary 
bond or remain in jail.95  In theory, this practice requires an 
individuated factual determination regarding the two issues of flight 
and risk.  Many jurisdictions, however, maintain bail schedules that 
 
 92. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1328 (describing in more detail 
the lack of probable cause in urban arrest policies). 
 93. PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S 
EASTERN DISTRICT 119–20, 155 (2008). 
 94. Wesley G. Skogan & Tracey L. Meares, Lawful Policing, 593 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 71 (2004). 
 95. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
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automatically set bail amounts based on the nature of the offense, 
without regard to the defendant’s particular characteristics.96  More 
generally, studies show that courts routinely make categorical bail 
decisions, being more likely to detain and/or impose higher bail 
amounts on racial minorities and the poor.97  Since defendants are 
often unrepresented in this process, there is no attorney to ensure 
that the specifics of the defendant’s situation are considered.98 
While bail technically does not go to substantive questions of guilt, 
it can powerfully influence whether a defendant pleads guilty.  An 
incarcerated defendant is more likely to suffer personal and economic 
hardship pending trial, less able to work with a lawyer to defend her 
case, and thus more likely to take a deal.99  Accordingly, the 
aggregating tendencies of the bail process contribute in practice to the 
ultimate question of who will sustain a criminal conviction. 
C. Prosecutorial Screening 
Institutionally speaking, the job of deciding who shall be formally 
charged with a crime belongs to prosecutors.100  Central to the 
prosecutor’s task is the screening of police arrest decisions and sorting 
through which cases should proceed as formal criminal cases.101  This 
is supposed to be an individuated inquiry on a number of fronts: 
prosecutors consider the evidence, but also make equitable and policy 
decisions about what cases deserve prosecution.102 
 
 96. Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 26 
CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 12, 15. 
 97. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination 
in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987 (1994); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 34, 
at 3 (2010).  Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon cite preventive detention as a 
“practice[] that most clearly exemplifies the qualities of actuarial justice” due to its 
reliance on categorical information and “collective algorithm[s].” Feeley & Simon, 
supra note 55, at 175–77. 
 98. Douglas Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 
386–87 (2011) (half of all jurisdictions provide no counsel at bail and defendants may 
remain incarcerated for one to four weeks or more). 
 99. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1343–47 (documenting the 
pressure that pre-trial detention exerts on defendants to plead guilty). 
 100. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“Whether to 
prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that 
generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”).  In lower courts, police may have the 
authority to file charging documents in minor cases. See Surell Brady, Arrests 
Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2000). 
 101. Bordenkirscher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
 102. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision 
Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010). 
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With respect to minor offenses, however, prosecutors in some 
jurisdictions forgo the screening inquiry and convert arrests into 
charges more or less automatically.  This fact is reflected in low rates 
at which prosecutors decline cases.  In New York and Iowa, for 
example, Josh Bowers found declination rates for certain minor 
offenses as low as 2% or less, meaning that 98% of those police arrest 
decisions converted to criminal charges.103  A Vera Institute study 
found similarly low prosecutorial declination rates in misdemeanor 
drug cases in North Carolina.104  As Surell Brady put it, because 
prosecutors spend so little effort screening cases before trial, “an 
individual’s loss of freedom and the prosecutorial merit of most of 
those cases stand or fall solely on a police officer’s judgment about 
the legal sufficiency of the evidence and of the rules of law applicable 
to the cited offense(s), and on the officer’s judgment about the merit 
of an individual case from a public policy perspective.”105  Prosecutors 
typically lavish more scrutiny and attention on serious charges and 
therefore make more granular judgments about which cases to 
prosecute and which ones to decline.  By contrast, in petty cases 
where stakes are low and caseloads are heavy, prosecutors tend to 
rely on and defer more to initial police decisions.106 
To be sure, declination rates vary widely by jurisdiction and many 
low-level arrests never lead to anything more than a night or two in 
jail.107  But where declination rates are low and prosecutors fail to 
screen, the aggregative tendencies of arrest decisions translate 
directly into aggregate prosecutorial decisions. 
 
 103. Id. at 1716–18. 
 104. Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 32 (2009) (statement of Wayne S. McKenzie, Director, Prosecution & 
Racial Justice Program, Vera Inst. of Justice), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/printers/111th/111-78_53093.PDF. 
 105. Brady, supra note 100, at 22. 
 106. Bowers, supra note 102. 
 107. Edward Ericson Jr., Copping Out: A City Council Report on False Arrests by 
Baltimore Police Fails to Address the Root of the Problem, BALT. CITY PAPER, Oct. 
5, 2005, http://www2.citypaper.com/film/story.asp?id=10980 (one third of Baltimore 
loitering arrests dismissed). Compare Bowers, supra note 102 (reporting NY 
marijuana declination rates at less than 10 percent), with Issa Kohler-Hausmann, 
Misdemeanor Justice: The Penal Logic of Dismissal 13 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, New York University) (on file with author) (45% of all NY 
misdemeanor arrests result in dismissal). 
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D. Defense Counsel: “Meet ‘Em and Plead ‘Em” Lawyering 
When all else fails, the American criminal process depends on 
defense counsel to ensure that defendants are treated as individuals.  
It is defense counsel’s job to challenge indiscriminate arrest and 
charging decisions, to debunk existing evidence, ferret out new facts, 
and generally to ensure that individuating procedural rules protect 
her client.108  Just as important, it is counsel’s responsibility to protect 
cognitive and dignitary aspects of individuation: to talk to her client, 
to hear what he has to say about his case, and to educate him about 
his choices.109 
In the current climate of overworked public defenders and massive 
misdemeanor dockets, defense counsel cannot meaningfully perform 
these individuating functions.  For example, a 2009 report entitled 
Minor Crimes, Massive Waste studied misdemeanor dockets across 
the country.110  In some jurisdictions, the report found misdemeanor 
caseloads in the many hundreds or even thousands, in which 
attorneys literally had minutes to resolve each case.111  The results of 
the overload included attorney incompetence, the inability to consult 
with clients and prepare cases, and other violations of the attorneys’ 
ethical obligations.112  Numerous other studies and scholars have 
come to the same conclusion, namely, that scale of misdemeanor 
dockets and caseloads have largely eviscerated the individuating 
function of defense counsel.113 
The right-to-counsel literature has amassed a long list of the 
harmful consequences that flow from overloaded dockets and the 
attendant breakdown of the defense function.  To that list we can now 
add one more item.  We rely on the defense function to stem the 
trend towards aggregation that characterizes the modern criminal 
 
 108. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (“[I]t is through counsel that all other 
rights of the accused are protected.”). 
 109. Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as 
Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 754 (1970) (noting crucial role of advice of counsel in dissipating coercive effects 
of plea bargaining). 
 110. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 60. 
 111. Id. at 21. 
 112. Id. at 22–24. 
 113. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 
(2004); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES 
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (describing thin process and lack of 
representation in New Haven misdemeanor courts); Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication 
of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1158 (2004). 
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process, to turn defendants into individuals before the law even if the 
police and prosecutors have failed to do so.  By overloading public 
defenders, we prevent them from fulfilling their individuating 
function and ensure that the wave of aggregation proceeds 
uninterrupted.114 
E. Off-the-Rack Plea Bargains 
Where prosecutors fail to screen and defense attorneys lack time to 
insist on individuation, the plea process becomes a categorical 
exercise.  Prosecutors make standard offers based on the offense of 
arrest, and bargains are struck based on the institutional habits of the 
local jurisdiction. 
The aggregative impact of plea bargaining is two-fold.  Most 
importantly, institutional pressure to plead guilty rather than litigate 
converts defendants into criminals in bulk.  The pervasive assumption 
that cases will plead out means that everyone is expected to sustain 
some sort of conviction; the only thing left to negotiate is the name of 
the crime and the precise punishment. 
Second, the extent of punishment is also determined largely in the 
aggregate, by reference to the local “price” for certain offenses.  This 
categorical quality of plea bargaining has been observed even in the 
felony context.  As William Stuntz wrote, plea bargains are typically 
set based on “customary practices” and repeat players are “likely to 
have a good sense of the ‘market price’ for any particular case.”115  In 
this felony model, prosecutors and defense attorneys bargain in the 
shadow of customary prices for certain kinds of offenses, adjusting 
outcomes based on the individuating circumstances of a particular 
case. 
In petty cases, by contrast, plea bargains take place in bulk, 
detached from the facts and circumstances of individual cases and are 
therefore more heavily determined by the going rate.  As Malcolm 
Feeley eloquently put it, “[t]he reality of American [misdemeanor 
justice] . . . is more akin to modern supermarkets in which prices for 
 
 114. I discuss the inherently limited ability of misdemeanor defense counsel to 
ensure fairness at greater length in Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, supra note 3. 
 115. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1909, 1923–24 (1992) (asserting that plea bargains are “individualized” and not 
“mass marketed”); see also id. at 1933 (plea bargaining constrained by “customary 
‘market’ prices’”); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2481, 2482 n.78, 2515 (2004) (noting that jurisdictions have 
customary “rates” for recurring cases and situations). 
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various commodities have been clearly established and labeled in 
advance.”116  In one New York borough, for example, it is the practice 
for prosecutors always to offer a deferred prosecution (known as an 
“Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal” (ACD)) to first-time 
marijuana arrestees and for judges to accept such dispositions, even 
where defendants appear to be innocent and outright dismissal would 
therefore be appropriate.117  In the South Bronx, police use a 
boilerplate complaint to charge trespassing cases so that the factual 
record and charge is standardized, and defendants almost universally 
plead to light sentences.118  In Salt Lake City, prosecutors in domestic 
violence cases tell the court that they are seeking the “standard 
package,” which includes a uniform charge bargain and sentence.119 
In these ways, the aggregate practices of misdemeanor prosecutors 
and defenses attorneys result in predictable, standardized 
pronouncements of guilt and punishment.  Because those attorneys 
lack time and incentives to collect all but the most superficial 
information about cases, those standardized pleas cannot be assumed 
to reflect defendant culpability, the availability of defenses, or the 
strength of the evidence.  Instead, these convictions are better 
understood as a product of local jurisdiction practices and all the 
other institutional, aggregative practices that generated the case in 
the first place. 
F. Judges and the Mass Court Process 
Although the individuating influence of the judge is less in an 
adversarial than an inquisitorial system, American judges still 
theoretically play an important part in ensuring that cases are handled 
on the merits and defendants are treated as unique individuals.  At 
trial, judges not only enforce the rules, but also may be called on after 
the fact to decide the sufficiency of the evidence—that is, whether 
 
 116. FEELEY, supra note 113, at 187. 
 117. See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 107, at 16–17 (describing “normative 
practice” in New York borough). 
 118. M. Chris Fabricant, Rousting the Cops: One Man Stands Up to the NYPD’s 
Apartheid-Like Trespassing Crackdown, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 30, 2007, 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2007-10-30/news/rousting-the-cops/. 
 119. Rekha Mirchandani, What’s So Special About Specialized Courts? The State 
and Social Change in Salt Lake City’s Domestic Violence Court, 39 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 379, 397 (2005); see also Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE 
L.J. 2, 56 (2006) (noting that in domestic violence cases the “final order of protection 
is so common that it is plausible to consider it a standard disposition sought by 
prosecutors”). 
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there was enough evidence adduced at trial to find a particular 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.120  More frequently, 
judges presiding over guilty pleas must establish a factual basis for the 
plea, and the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea by directly 
addressing the defendant and asking him personal questions.121 
In his famous study of the lower court process, Malcolm Feeley 
concluded that misdemeanor judges do not play this individuating 
role; rather, such courts process defendants through in bulk with little 
or no attention to specific facts or defendant understanding.  Feeley 
describes the typical court proceeding as follows: 
Arrestees were arraigned in groups and informed of their rights en 
masse.  At times the arrestees were not even aware that they are 
being addressed.  Judges did not always look at them, and even if a 
judge made an effort to be heard, he could not always be understood 
over the constant din of the courtroom. . . .  While a few cases took 
up as much as a minute or two of the court’s time . . . the 
overwhelming majority of cases took just a few seconds.122 
Numerous authors have replicated Feeley’s conclusions, noting 
that lower court processes are non-individuated and insensitive to 
evidence.123  As Josh Bowers puts it, the misdemeanor process is one 
in which “[g]uilt is typically presumed in a process too rough-and-
ready for the parties to develop and consider it properly.”124 
To date, courts have not recognized aggregation per se as a threat 
to the validity of pleas.  The Ninth Circuit, for example, recently 
concluded that the mere lack of an individuated plea procedure does 
not violate due process.125  The Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
mass plea process conducted in Arizona under the auspices of the 
“Operation Streamline” program.  In that program, “a magistrate 
judge is assigned to preside over a group hearing of fifty to seventy 
defendants charged with petty misdemeanor violations of illegal 
entry.  The hearing combines the defendants’ initial appearances, 
guilty pleas, and sentencing hearings into one proceeding.”126  The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that because defendants were counseled and 
 
 120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. 
 121. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 122. FEELEY, supra note 113, at 9–11. 
 123. See Weinstein, supra note 113 (describing dynamic in lower New York 
courts); BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 60. 
 124. Bowers, supra note 102, at 1707. 
 125. United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 126. Id. at 655. 
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had the opportunity to opt out of the mass process, their pleas were 
sufficiently informed and voluntary.127  In other words, the Court did 
not recognize any legally cognizable impact of the fact that procedure 
was aggregated: it asked instead whether there was any evidence that 
a particular defendant’s plea was involuntary.  Other courts have 
reached similar conclusions.128 
G. The Defendant 
The final bastion of individuation is the defendant himself.  He has 
various constitutional rights to ensure that his case is decided on the 
merits in ways that he chooses: he has the right to self-represent, the 
right to trial, to testify or to remain silent, and to confront the 
witnesses against him.129  Most importantly, given the prevalence of 
pleas, he has the right not to be bound by a plea he did not 
understand or was coerced into making.130 
In the petty offense context, these protections routinely fail to 
ensure that defendants receive individual consideration.  Many 
misdemeanor defendants do not know what their rights are and, given 
limited time to consult with counsel, are unlikely to learn or 
understand them.131  Instead, defendants typically are made to 
understand that they will be represented in a slapdash manner, that 
they must plead or risk a longer sentence or a stint in jail, that the 
evidence in their cases will not be examined, and that they have no 
choice in the matter. 
For example, in jurisdictions around the country including Texas, 
Washington, Pennsylvania, and Colorado, researchers have found 
that judges often refer misdemeanor defendants directly to 
prosecutors, without appointing counsel, and tell them to go “work 
 
 127. Id. at 657–58.  The court also noted that the mass-plea process had previously 
been held to violate Rule 11’s “personal address” requirement, id. at 657, but that 
error was held to be harmless. Id. (citing United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 
701 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 128. United States v. Salazar-Olivares, 179 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999) (group plea did 
not constitute plain error under Rule 11); United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 
F.3d 1215, 1223 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding group plea consisting of two codefendants, 
concluding that Rule 11 requirement that each defendant be addressed “personally” 
did not mean that each defendant had to be addressed “individually”). 
 129. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (right to trial and confront witnesses); Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self-representation); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 
U.S. 157 (1986) (right to testify on own behalf). 
 130. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 131. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1344 (describing limits on average 
defendant knowledge and capacity). 
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out” their pleas.132  For example, in Georgia, one ABA witness 
described: 
[A] mass arraignment of defendants charged with jailable 
misdemeanors during which the judge informed defendants of their 
rights and then left the bench.  Afterwards, three prosecutors told 
defendants to line up and follow them one by one into a private 
room.  When the judge reentered the courtroom, each defendant 
approached with the prosecutor, who informed the judge that the 
defendant intended to waive counsel and plead guilty to the 
charges.133 
In such cases, the tribunal effectively instructs defendants that their 
only option is to plead guilty.  Even when counsel is appointed, the 
high volume process puts defense counsel in the position of 
channeling defendants into pleas rather than meaningfully educating 
them about their rights and options. 
The sum total of aggregating pressures thus often deprives 
defendants of autonomous choice, the defendant’s last defense 
against group treatment and collective guilt.  I say “often” due to the 
sheer number of defendants who are processed in low-level courts 
without counsel or meaningful representation.  There are 
approximately ten million misdemeanor cases filed every year, the 
vast majority of which are processed in bulk without meaningful 
scrutiny or assistance of counsel.134  Nevertheless, misdemeanor 
defendants are not all similarly situated: better-educated and better-
resourced defendants can demand more individuation, in large part 
because they can insist on lawyers and procedures that preserve the 
individuating aspects of their cases.135  By contrast, sub-literate and 
disadvantaged defendants are stuck with group procedures with no 
meaningful way to opt out.  In these ways, the aggregating pressure of 
the misdemeanor process silences most individuals even as it creates 
the appearance of individuated admissions of guilt. 
The urban misdemeanor process can thus be understood as a series 
of iterative aggregations.  From arrest to bail to defense to plea, 
urban misdemeanants are subject to an array of informal aggregating 
 
 132. See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 60, at 16–17. 
 133. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
supra note 113, at 24–25. 
 134. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 60, at 11. 
 135. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 3–
19 (2009) (describing his experiences when he was prosecuted for misdemeanor 
assault). 
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forces that generate their ultimate convictions.  Like all complex 
processes, the picture is not absolute: there may well be some 
individuating factors at each stage of the process.  But the continuous 
pressure of aggregate decision making stage after stage weakens their 
force.  For example, a defendant may consult briefly with counsel, or 
there may be some evidence that he might be guilty.  These brushes 
with procedure and evidence do not mean he actually got an 
individuated determination of guilt, or that his conviction was 
generated in a meaningful sense by the evidence.  Instead, his 
conviction is better understood as the sort of thing likely to happen to 
people in his class.  That is a far cry from the individuation ideal 
celebrated in Supreme Court case law and by the theories of personal 
culpability that undergird our moral confidence in the criminal 
process. 
IV.  THE SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS OF INFORMAL AGGREGATION: 
LESSONS FROM THE CIVIL SIDE 
Unlike criminal law, civil law openly makes room for aggregation.  
The formal mechanisms of the class action, joinder, and multidistrict 
litigation have generated a robust literature on the dynamics of 
aggregation and its substantive and distributive effects.136  It is well 
understood that the decision to formally treat parties or issues in the 
aggregate changes the meaning and operation of the law.137 
This understanding has carried over into the realm of informal 
aggregation.  Civil law has its share of informal aggregating scenarios, 
and scholars have identified ways that they can have substantive and 
distributive effects even without formal class certification or other 
legally binding mechanisms.  In particular, two insights have strong 
resonance for the misdemeanor context.  The first is that a single 
powerful plaintiff bringing a large number of claims against dispersed 
defendants can induce widespread settlement on terms that may not 
track the substantive law or likely trial outcomes.  The second insight 
is that aggregate treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs through 
mass representation erodes the force of law and evidence, and can 
effectively create a no-fault regime in which mere allegations of injury 
can suffice to generate recovery.  These insights—and their relevance 
 
 136. E.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement 
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1873 (2006) 
(describing the influence that aggregate proceedings have on settlement). 
 137. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010). 
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to understanding the power of prosecutors and the dangers of mass 
indigent representation—are discussed below. 
A. The Power of Affirmative Informal Aggregation 
A certain class of civil defendant strongly resembles misdemeanor 
defendants.  The class consists of individuals who engage in 
widespread, common conduct generating small, low value claims: a 
leading example is unauthorized music downloaders.  There are 
thousands of them.  When sued by a single powerful plaintiff, such 
defendants often lack the resources or incentives to litigate on their 
own, even if they have a valid defense, and therefore predictably 
settle in large numbers. 
Assaf Hamdani and Alon Klement zero in on this type of 
defendant class as posing special efficacy and fairness problems for 
the civil system.138  They examine three examples: music file sharing, 
people sued by DirecTV as suspected signal pirates, and purchasers 
of fraudulent business leases who defaulted and were then sued by 
the seller LeaseComm.139  In each case, a well-resourced corporate 
plaintiff (Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), 
DirecTV, and LeaseComm respectively) brought cases against 
thousands of individuals in which the low value of each individual 
claim made it inefficient for individuals to defend, leading in turn to 
thousands of settlements.140  In each case, there was at least a 
plausible—and in some cases very clear—basis for defense, but 
defendants settled anyway.141 
This institutional paradigm—a single well-resourced plaintiff 
bringing low-value claims against thousands of dispersed 
defendants—has familiar and influential contours.  First, it generates 
widespread settlement even where claims may be weak or fraudulent.  
This is the misdemeanor process through the civil looking glass: in the 
criminal version, large numbers of low-level offenders lack counsel 
and/or personal resources and therefore plead guilty when confronted 
by the unified power of the state, even where evidence is weak or the 
defendants are clearly innocent.142 
 
 138. Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CAL. L. REV. 685 
(2005). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 699–708. 
 142. See supra Part III. 
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The paradigm also permits plaintiffs to raise the costs of litigation 
for defendants in ways that ensure settlements that may be out of line 
with the actual merits of the cases.143  Hamdani and Klement find this 
dynamic particularly troubling because it distorts the effect of legal 
rules and undermines the civil system’s ability to produce legally 
accurate and efficient outcomes through bargaining.144  Criminal 
scholars have noted the comparable function of charge inflation and 
bail: by overcharging defendants and seeking pre-trial detention, 
prosecutors inflate defendant litigation costs in ways that induce 
settlement, sometimes to charges that bear a weak relation to actual 
defendant conduct.145 
As a counter-weight, Hamdani and Klement note that defendants 
could aggregate in order to exploit the same economies of scale, 
resources and leverage that large plaintiffs do.146  Unlike civil law, 
however, the criminal arena has an inherent institutional imbalance: 
prosecutors can constitutionally and ethically aggregate on merits 
issues whereas defense counsel for the most part cannot.  
Prosecutorial offices can act in unison, with policies that impose 
uniform charges and/or sentence offers on entire classes of 
defendants.147  By contrast, defense counsel must litigate each case as 
if it were their only one, bargaining in the shadow of aggregate 
prosecutorial policies without adopting aggregate practices of their 
own.  A public defender office, for example, cannot insist that all 
trespassing cases go to trial, or that all loitering clients plead to time 
served, because such policies might not be in individual defendants’ 
best interests.148  This is in part why criminal defendants depend on 
 
 143. For example, RIAA and DirecTV set settlement amounts unrelated to actual 
damages. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 138, at 704.  LeaseComm brought all its 
actions in Massachusetts, which made it exorbitantly expensive for non-resident 
defendants to litigate. Id. at 707. 
 144. Id. at 706, 708. 
 145. William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 519–20 (2001) (on charge inflation); Bibas, supra note 115 (on the pressure 
exerted by bail). 
 146. Hamdani and Klement label this mechanism the “class defense.”  In the cases 
they discuss, potential defenses included fair use, problems with DirecTV’s proof of 
piracy, and the legitimacy of the underlying LeaseComm lease. Hamdani & Klement, 
supra note 138, at 699–708. 
 147. See, e.g., Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1150 (2012) (describing prosecutor’s office manual that set 
forth “‘defaults’ for case resolutions (that is, standard plea offers)”). 
 148. Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical 
Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1235–43 (2005) (describing ethical impediments to collective 
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collateral proceedings such as civil rights class actions to vindicate 
group rights; the individuated ideal of the criminal case impedes 
strategic aggregation on the part of the defense.149  Criminal counsel 
thus have weak access to the collective leverage that informal 
aggregation can confer. 
B. How Mass Representation Erodes Fault 
A certain class of civil plaintiff also strongly resembles 
misdemeanor defendants.  One example is plaintiffs represented by 
one or more large law firms who collectively work out bulk deals, 
which Richard Nagareda has called “mass settlement without class 
action.”150  Similarly, plaintiffs with small, low stakes personal injury 
claims such as car accidents whose cases are handled en masse by so-
called “settlement mills,” also resemble misdemeanor defendants.151  
As Nora Engstrom describes, these large firms often handle 
thousands of small cases at a time and almost universally resolve 
them through settlement on a categorical basis, often by non-legal 
personnel with little attorney involvement.152  Factual investigation 
and trials are almost non-existent, and plaintiffs receive standardized 
settlement sums from insurance companies.153  Much like criminal 
defendants whose public defenders handle hundreds of cases in 
cookie-cutter fashion, low-stakes tort plaintiffs whose claims are 
handled by settlement mill firms are processed mechanically without 
individuated attention.154  In the same way that petty defendants 
 
public defender action but also describing instances where defender offices 
collectively resisted prosecutorial policies); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, 
Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 
84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2422 (1996) (criticizing tendency of public defender offices to 
“uncritically accept individualized concepts of their role”). 
 149. See Brandon Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights (Univ. of Va. 
Sch. of Law Pub Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 2012-31, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2052250 (arguing that aggregation of procedural 
civil rights claims can benefit plaintiffs and the development of law and describing 
barriers to such aggregation). 
 150. Richard A. Nagareda, Embeded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1105, 1154–55 (2010) (discussing mass settlement in Vioxx case coordinated 
by large plaintiff law firms). 
 151. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
805 (2011) [hereinafter Engstrom, Sunlight]; see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-
of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485 (2009). 
 152.  See Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 151, at 817. 
 153. Id. at 816–17. 
 154. Id. 
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predictably plead and receive standard sentences, plaintiffs settle for 
standardized sums.155 
In the tort context, settlement mills offer certain benefits.  Plaintiffs 
with low-value claims might not otherwise obtain representation.156  
For routine and non-serious claims, plaintiffs may well receive an 
approximation of the actual value of their injuries.157  And they 
receive the money quickly and predictably without the cost and 
uncertainty of individualized litigation.158  In such cases, the benefits 
of bulk processing may outweigh the costs and risks of 
individuation.159 
Such arguments are not completely foreign in the criminal context.  
For example, routine bulk processing confers certain professional 
benefits on misdemeanor prosecutors and even defense counsel: 
attorneys can spend less time resolving standard cases and obtain 
predictable outcomes without the cost and time of litigation.160  Courts 
similarly benefit by being able to clear crowded dockets, and 
resources may be preserved for more serious cases.161  More radically, 
Josh Bowers has argued that misdemeanor defendants themselves are 
typically better off accepting standardized low-level plea offers 
because it permits them to avoid pre-trial jail time and the potential 
for higher sentences were they to litigate.162  In Bowers’s view, then, 
even innocent criminal defendants benefit instrumentally from the 
misdemeanor settlement mill. 
At the same time, settlement mills raise troubling red flags.  In 
particular, Engstrom worries that plaintiffs with non-routine, more 
serious injuries are being shortchanged both procedurally and 
substantively by having their claims resolved in aggregate fashion.163  
She argues that many plaintiffs are unaware that settlement mills do 
not actually provide traditional personal representation, or sometimes 
even representation by lawyers at all, and that these plaintiffs are 
 
 155. Id. at 822. 
 156. Id. at 831–32. 
 157. Id. at 828–29. 
 158. Id. at 829. 
 159. Id. at 824–33 (discussing costs and benefits of settlement mills). 
 160. See Bibas, supra note 115 (explaining that institutional and professional 
norms governing criminal legal practice often drive case resolutions more powerfully 
than do individual facts of the case). 
 161. See, e.g., Erica Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 (2007). 
 162. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008). 
 163. Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 151, at 836–42. 
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essentially being tricked.164  She also notes that the lack of scrutiny 
and the culture of settlement promote fraud.165 
The settlement mill scenario highlights the fact that the ability to 
resist aggregation and insist on individuated procedure is a potent 
bargaining chip.  That is why Engstrom worries about plaintiffs with 
serious injuries: by permitting themselves to be represented in the 
aggregate, they forgo the leverage that an individual adjudication 
would confer.166  Conversely, businesses that can resist potential 
plaintiff aggregation by insisting on individuated procedures such as 
arbitration obtain an advantage.167  This is precisely the dynamic of 
the penal pyramid: at the bottom, mass processing induces settlement 
by individual defendants unless they and/or their counsel can insist on 
the “luxury” of more expensive and time-consuming individuated 
procedures. 
The deepest insight from the settlement mill context, however, is 
that this sort of informal aggregation has substantive implications: 
settlement mills effectively create a no-fault tort scheme even in the 
absence of such a regime at law.168  As Engstrom describes it, 
settlement mills “straddl[e] no-fault and traditional tort,” providing a 
“blended mechanism” that offers many of the benefits of a no-fault 
scheme while “masquerading” as a traditional, individuated tort 
process.169  This slight-of-hand is apparent to everyone except 
individual plaintiffs.  As one attorney put it, “It really was very 
formulaic.  Everybody saw it that way, except for the client, who 
actually thought of themselves as an individual.”170 
The same slight-of-hand occurs in the misdemeanor process: 
pleading petty offenders in bulk without individuated procedures 
effectively creates a “no-fault” conviction regime in which the fact of 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 838–39. 
 167. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 
ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 69 (2007) (“Skeptics [of arbitration] object that businesses use 
arbitration to prevent [plaintiffs’] aggregation, forcing consumer and employee 
claimants into individualized proceedings where neither they nor their lawyers can 
counter the advantages enjoyed by more powerful repeat players.”). 
 168. See also Hamdani & Klement, supra note 138, at 708 (“A regime in which 
defendants always settle is essentially a no-fault regime.”). 
 169. Engstom, Sunlight, supra note 151, at 837. 
 170. Id. 
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arrest is sufficient to induce settlement.171  While professional 
participants know that the process is “assembly line,” the system 
straddles the “no-fault”-culpability distinction by maintaining the 
fiction that defendants are receiving individuated justice based on 
personal culpability. 
It is here that the possibility of fraud and its criminal counterpart, 
wrongful conviction, poses the greatest threat.  In a no-fault scheme, 
proof of the right sort of injury is typically sufficient to trigger 
recovery.172  The integrity of the system thus rests heavily on the 
validity of the initial proof, since recovery flows inevitably from it.  
But weak screening mechanisms and routine settlement habits 
weaken that proof.  With respect to settlement mills, the 
understanding that insurance companies will settle in exchange for 
limited liability and cost-control creates the risk that fraudulent 
claims will slip though.173  In the same way, the understanding 
between defense counsel and prosecution that the vast majority of 
petty cases will be pled out without litigation permits false claims—
i.e., bad arrests and baseless charges—to convert to convictions. 
This is the misdemeanor system at its worst: when the mere 
allegation of probable cause, i.e., the fact of arrest, becomes enough 
to guarantee conviction.  Without the robust checking mechanisms of 
the adversarial process, we cannot be confident that those initial 
allegations are valid.  In these ways, the institutional aggregations of 
mass representation simultaneously erode the legal status of fault and 
exacerbate the risk of wrongful conviction.174 
V.  THE OXYMORON OF AGGREGATE CRIMINAL GUILT 
Criminal justice is a special sort of law—at least it is supposed to 
be.  As Henry Hart famously put it, a crime “is not simply anything 
which a legislature chooses to call a ‘crime.’”175  Likewise, the power 
 
 171. This scheme is “no-fault” in the institutional sense that the government need 
not prove culpability, not in the narrower, substantive sense that the defendants lack 
mens rea. 
 172. Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. 
L. REV. 699, 703–15 (2005) (describing a variety of no-fault compensation schemes 
and their respective triggers). 
 173. Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 151, at 833–34. 
 174. I discuss this shift away from fault at length in the first article, Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1366–68. 
 175. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401, 406 (1958) (arguing that in order to qualify as a crime, prohibited 
conduct must invite community condemnation). 
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to punish is a unique form of governmental authority that can be 
exercised only in highly constrained ways consistent with democratic 
values.176  While we lack agreement about what precisely should 
constitute a crime, or the proper way to punish, the ongoing dispute 
reflects an underlying consensus that criminal justice is different in 
kind from other legal edicts and forms of governmental control. 
The urban misdemeanor system strains the limits of criminal law 
exceptionalism.  Many petty offenses forbid common, widespread, 
victimless conduct of no particular moral import—in other words, 
conduct that doesn’t look particularly culpable.  Order maintenance 
policing is often driven by aims barely distinguishable from urban 
public policies such as zoning, traffic laws, and health and housing 
codes.177  And as this Article has detailed, urban misdemeanants are 
often handled in the aggregate: identified, prosecuted, and punished 
in ways that ignore definitional criminal commitments to 
individuation, evidence, and the ultimate requirement that 
defendants be personally culpable.178 
To put it another way, the defining principles of criminal justice 
appear to run out of steam at the bottom of the penal pyramid where 
offenses are petty and defendants are poorest.  At the top, in serious 
cases and for well-resourced defendants, the principles are alive and 
well largely because such defendants have the leverage to insist on 
individuated procedures.  At the bottom, however, these principles do 
little work.  This fact has at least two significant consequences.  The 
first is to destabilize the traditional assertion that the criminal system 
 
 176. See Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CAL. L. 
REV. 601, 614 (2009) (describing classic Hobbesian claim that “[o]nly the sovereign—
who is not a party to the social contract—retains the broad discretion to use force, 
and so only the sovereign may punish”); Dolovich, supra note 10. 
 177. See, e.g., NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, 
POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 2–3 (2009); Katherine 
Beckett & Steve Herbert, The Punitive City Revisited: The Transformation of Urban 
Social Control, in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY AND A NEW 
RECONSTRUCTION 106, 109–10 (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008) (describing 
the variety of urban criminal legal tools deployed to “‘clean up’ particular urban 
spaces”). 
 178. Mona Lynch argues that this group-based conceptualization of the criminal 
defendant pervades criminal law more generally.  She argues that “[t]he individuality 
formerly ascribed to offenders has nearly vanished.  In its place is a broad, near-
caricaturelike construction of the punished offender that relies on simple, disposition-
based understandings of criminality and a variety of racial, cultural, class-based, and 
gendered stereotypes as its basis.” Mona Lynch, The Contemporary Penal Subject(s), 
in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION 
89, 98 (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008). 
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is individuated and rule-bound.179  Because the bottom of the pyramid 
is very big—most U.S. cases are petty and most defendants are 
poor180—our systemic ideals of individuation, due process, and 
culpability actually govern a relatively small percentage of cases.  
Instead, and counterintuitively, the aggregative culture of the bottom 
is in fact the dominant systemic norm, even though it baldly 
contradicts individuating legality principles in Supreme Court 
doctrine and much of the theoretical criminal literature. 
The second consequence is to create uncertainty about the 
appropriate legal and moral significance of convictions generated at 
the bottom of the penal pyramid.  Misdemeanor aggregative culture 
all too often ignores the core premise of the criminal model: that the 
question of guilt is ultimately and essentially one of individual 
responsibility.  It is precisely because (and only when) criminal guilt is 
individualized that we are justified in levying individual judgments, 
punishment, and stigma against those found to be criminal.181  
Without this bedrock ingredient of individuation, a “conviction” 
means something very different.  Insofar as urban misdemeanor 
convictions lack individualization, we need to question the pedigree 
of the process at the bottom of the penal pyramid and ask whether it 
truly qualifies as “criminal.” 
One way to ask that question is through the lens of Herbert 
Packer’s famous distinction between the “Crime Control” and “Due 
Process” models of criminal justice.182  The misdemeanor system is the 
quintessential example of how a system ostensibly governed by 
“formal, adjudicative, adversary fact-finding processes”183 and 
putatively committed to the “primacy of the individual and the 
 
 179. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1997) (noting that the traditional picture of 
the criminal system as governed by formal criminal procedure is “wrong”). 
 180. Approximately ten million misdemeanor cases are filed each year.  By 
comparison, there are approximately one million annual felony convictions. 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 3, at 1320. 
 181. See e.g., W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In 
re Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2011) 
(arguing that stigma constitutes the defining line between civil and criminal 
punishment). 
 182. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 153 (1968); see 
also Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process 
Model, 36 LAW & SOC. INQ. 237 (2011) (surveying “academic fascination” with 
Packer’s two models). 
 183. PACKER, supra note 182, at 163–64. 
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complementary concept of limitation of official power”184 can in fact 
function as a crime control model driven by a “presumption of 
guilt”185 in which “routine stereotyped procedures” produce “an 
assembly-line conveyor belt down which moves an endless stream of 
cases.”186  Although Packer posited the crime control model as an 
ideal type and not an actual description,187 the aggregating tendencies 
of the petty offense process in fact amount to a crime control 
system—legal practices through which people are presumed guilty 
upon arrest and treated not as individuals entitled to due process, but 
rather as threats or risks subject to monitoring and control.  The 
informal aggregations of the urban petty offense system are thus not 
mistakes or mere deviations from the due process model: they are the 
concrete socio-legal practices and institutions that permit the crime 
control model to function and dispense criminal convictions 
notwithstanding the existence of a legitimating due process 
ideology.188 
A different way of framing the question—are misdemeanors really 
“criminal”?—is to ask whether the mass quality of the American 
criminal system has altered its normative nature and political 
authority.  In 1994, Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon maintained 
that the “Old Penology”—concerned with individual guilt and moral 
responsibility—was giving way to an “actuarial” approach to justice 
concerned with management of groups.189  In 2006, Bernard Harcourt 
worried that “prediction instruments increasingly determine 
individual outcomes in our policing, law enforcement, and 
punishment practices.”190  In 2012, Stephanos Bibas mourned that the 
“[c]riminal justice used to be individualized, moral, transparent and 
participatory, but has become impersonal, amoral, hidden, and 
insulated from the people.”191  Misdemeanors represent the 
paradigmatic example of these sociological claims: the place in the 
system where doctrinal commitments to individuality and personal 
fault are most eroded, and where actuarial, impersonal tendencies 
exert the greatest power over outcomes.  In other words, if the 
 
 184. Id. at 165. 
 185. Id. at 160 (in many cases the “presumption of guilt” begins to operate “as 
soon as the suspect is arrested”). 
 186. Id. at 159. 
 187. Id. at 153. 
 188. I am indebted to Markus Dubber for this point. 
 189. See Feeley & Simon, supra note 55, at 173. 
 190. HARCOURT supra note 55, at 2 . 
 191. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE xviii (2012). 
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misdemeanor process qualifies as criminal, it is because we’ve 
changed what the criminal system does and how it is allowed to do it. 
Markus Dubber makes a similar point, arguing that the war on 
crime, with its focus on possession, drugs, and other victimless 
offenses, is in fact a policing regime that seeks to control and 
eliminate threats rather than identify and punish individual crimes.  
As he puts it: 
Policing human threats is different from punishing persons.  A 
police regime doesn’t punish.  It seeks to eliminate threats . . . .  It 
resembles environmental regulation of hazardous waste more than it 
does the criminal law of punishment.192 
Dubber traces how modern policing—by which he means not only 
police investigations and arrests but the entire criminal apparatus—
has eroded or “hollowed out” criminal law’s classic ingredients from 
mens rea and actus reus to the harm principle.  He concludes that the 
war on crime is best understood as a form of “state nuisance 
control.”193 
Importantly, Dubber notes that although the policing regime is 
non-criminal in its essence, it masquerades as a criminal process: 
The effort to disguise itself as bread-and-butter criminal law is an 
important component of a modern police regime. . . .  [Because of 
potential opposition it i’s] in the interest of a police regime both to 
retain traces of traditional criminal law and to infiltrate traditional 
criminal law by manipulating its established doctrines, rather than to 
do away with it altogether.194 
This masquerade is precisely the dynamic of the misdemeanor 
system.  By calling itself a criminal process and labeling its outcomes 
as criminal convictions, the petty offense system has co-opted the 
tools of criminal investigation and adjudication while abandoning 
core principles of individuated culpability.195  The masquerade 
succeeds in part because criminal law lacks analytic tools to identify 
 
 192. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of 
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 833 (2001). 
 193. Id. at 834, 839; see also MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: 
PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 158–61 (2005) 
(arguing that petty offenses have historically evaded legality constraints). 
 194. Dubber, supra note 192, at 834. 
 195. See Fabricant, supra note 14, at 388 (arguing that zero tolerance policing 
effectively imposes group guilt); Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining 
Police Conduct “Outside the Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 617, 
620 (2006) (arguing that because urban policing is so ill-suited to the criminal model, 
public officials other than police should do it). 
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the “hollowing out” effects of aggregation.  More broadly, it succeeds 
because transparency and political accountability are in short supply 
at the bottom of the pyramid. 
Finally, the misdemeanor process may succeed in retaining its 
“criminal” pedigree in the self-fulfilling sense that widespread 
informal aggregation has altered our collective understanding of what 
justice is supposed to look like.  It is well known that racial profiling is 
self-reinforcing, exacerbating social stereotypes and sending a 
message of “presumed Black criminality.”196  Aggregation works in 
similar ways within the adjudicative system to create a presumption of 
guilt.  Heavy caseloads and bulk processing wear down prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and judges, causing them to lose touch with the 
individuating principles that are supposed to govern their respective 
roles.197  As Judge Robert Pratt put it,  
[w]ith so many guilty pleas taking place, it is far too easy for 
everyone involved to start believing that ‘everyone is guilty’ and that 
establishing guilt on the record is just a ‘formality.’  With such an 
attitude comes complacency and a lack of attention to the details of 
the plea proceeding.198   
Like racial profiling, the dehumanizing component of aggregation 
changes the ways that its subjects are perceived. 
Even defendants may succumb and lose sight of their own 
individuality as the system treats them in the aggregate over and over 
again.  As professor and veteran public defender Abbe Smith once 
put it, “[o]ne of the most outrageous things about indigent criminal 
defense is the lack of outrage in many clients.Too often the poor 
become accustomed to mistreatment.  They become accustomed to 
being processed like parts on a conveyor belt, to not being seen at 
all.”199 
 
 196. Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of 
Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 800–01 (1999); see 
also Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 
952 (2002) (describing psychological effects on African Americans of their 
subordinate position and vulnerability to constant police scrutiny). 
 197. See AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 257–66 
(2009); Bibas, supra note 115, at 2474, 2482 (on the institutional habits of defense and 
prosecutors). 
 198. Judge Robert Pratt, The Implications of Padilla v. Kentucky on Practice in 
United States District Courts, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 169, 180 (2011). 
 199. Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and 
Fractured Ego of the Empathetic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1203, 1261 (2004). 
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All this is to say that the way we actually run the criminal system 
affects our conception of how we should run the criminal system.  
Harcourt argues that the turn towards the actuarial has “begun to 
shape our conception of just punishment,” such that we now accept 
prediction as a just and fair way of evaluating culpability and 
punishment.200  Likewise, the turn towards aggregation is making 
group-based treatment and mass processes seem familiar and 
acceptable, weakening our intuitive and longstanding commitment to 
individuated guilt, and permitting the petty offense process to “pass” 
for criminal justice. 
CONCLUSION 
“When you’re young and you’re black, no matter how you look you 
fit the description.” 
–Tyquan, age 18, Brooklyn resident201 
 
At the heart of the criminal system’s claim to coercive and punitive 
legitimacy lies the assertion that it convicts and punishes for the right 
reasons: because someone committed a crime and was therefore 
culpable in ways that invite a coercive state response.  And for all the 
flaws in the ways that serious crimes are investigated and prosecuted, 
these reasons remain dominant.  With rare exceptions, rape and 
homicide defendants are arrested and prosecuted because someone 
thinks they committed a crime.  Of course, as the innocence 
movement has demonstrated, those conclusions are all too often 
factually inaccurate, but the process remains constrained by classic 
criminal law justifications of evidence and culpability. 
By contrast, the urban misdemeanor system is not always driven by 
such justifications.  At its best, order maintenance policing aims to do 
what zoning, nuisance law, and other urban development policies do: 
improve the livability, safety, and economic value of shared urban 
 
 200. HARCOURT, supra note 55, at 31; see also Feeley & Simon, supra note 55, at 
192 (“It is not that [law enforcement] officials are ‘merely’ violating traditional ideals 
of equality when dealing with or intervening in underclass communities, it is that they 
are animated by a powerful new social logic, risk management.”). 
 201. Julie Dressner & Edwin Martinez, The Scars of Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/video/2012/06/12/opinion/100000001601732/ 
the-scars-of-stop-and-frisk.html (1:03). 
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spaces.202  Those are laudable goals, but they are not centrally about 
evidence and culpability.  The bureaucracies of the adjudicative 
process—prosecution offices, public defenders, and courts—largely 
obey institutional demands for case processing and docket clearing.  
These processes may be more efficient than the individuated model, 
but they are dissociated from the core culpability concerns of criminal 
law.  In these concrete ways, the urban petty offense process has let 
go of the reasons and procedures that validate the imposition of 
criminal convictions. 
In part as a result, the urban misdemeanor process is losing its 
credibility with the people it polices and convicts.203  Residents of 
places like Brownsville clearly believe that they are selected by race, 
class status, and neighborhood, in other words based on group 
membership and other aggregate criteria and not on the 
individualized bases of evidence and culpability.204  As Tyquan, the 
18-year-old African American man quoted above put it, “I was so 
confused the first time [I was stopped by police.]  I thought you had 
to do something for them to really stop you, but after that, I seen that 
you didn’t have to do nothing to get stopped.”205  While the petty 
criminal process maintains that it is motivated by crime and disorder, 
its subjects apparently believe it to be motivated by social status. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the subjects have it right, at 
least more right than criminal law gives them credit for.  The weak 
individuating procedures in the petty offense process have eroded the 
roles that evidence and law play in generating convictions, and 
aggregate decision-making dominates each stage of the process.  A 
young black male in a poor urban neighborhood out in public at night 
has a predictable chance of being arrested for and ultimately 
convicted of a minor urban offense of some kind, whether he commits 
any criminal acts or not.  The fact that some weakly individuating 
 
 202. See, e.g., GARNETT, supra note 177, at 208–09 (2009); TRACEY MEARES & 
DAN KAHAN, URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER CITY COMMUNITIES 
(1999). 
 203. See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social 
Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 173, 212–22 (2008) (charting law enforcement’s reduced legitimacy in overpoliced 
minority communities). 
 204. Dressner & Martinez, supra note 201; Matthew Orr, Ray Rivera & Al Baker, 
Stop and Frisk in Brownsville, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/video/2010/07/11/nyregion/1247468422062/stop-and-frisk-in-
brownsville-brooklyn.html (interviewing African American residents). 
 205. Dressner & Martinez, supra note 201. 
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factors may appear in that process—perhaps he will make a furtive 
gesture, or consult with counsel for a few minutes—does not render 
the process individuated.  Rather, that process is best understood as 
imposing guilt in the aggregate.  If the urban misdemeanor process is 
to regain its credibility with its own subjects, it needs either to 
embrace the individuated model more fully, or relinquish the punitive 
moral mantle of criminal law and admit that it is attempting to do 
something different. 
